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Academic Freedom, Job Security,
and Costs
Richard K. Neumann Jr.
Claims are sometimes made that academic job security—whether tenure 
or another type required by accreditation—is not needed to protect academic 
freedom, and that job security imposes unnecessary costs. This article explains 
why those claims are false.
1. Job Security Is Essential to Academic Freedom
Our concept of a university originated in Germany in the late nineteenth 
century and arrived in the United States when American academics returned 
from study abroad, importing the idea of a university as a center for both 
learning and research protected by academic freedom.1 German universities 
recognized academic freedom in two forms: Lernfreiheit, the student’s freedom 
to learn, and Lehrfreiheit, the teacher’s freedom “to examine bodies of evidence 
and to report his fi ndings in lecture or published form,” or in other words 
“freedom of teaching and freedom of inquiry.”2
Inevitably, confl ict ensued. American faculty members were vulnerable to 
powerful business interests, trustees, and donors who might be off ended by 
unconstrained teaching and research. “Over and over again the same pattern 
repeated itself: an academic publicly urged reforms or criticized the existing 
social order and was then summarily dismissed for his trouble.”3
The most notorious incident was Stanford University’s dismissal of 
the economist Edward A. Ross—not for his scholarship, but instead for his 
politics. Among other things, Ross had supported Eugene V. Debs, the labor 
leader who had been convicted for defying a federal injunction during the 
1. RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WILLIAM P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
IN THE UNITED STATES 367–412 (1955). The oldest European universities (Bologna and Paris) 
date from the eleventh century, but our model is the nineteenth-century German model.
2. Id. at 386–87.
3. CHRISTOPHER J. LUCAS, AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A HISTORY 202 (2006). The history, 
including the AAUP’s founding, are well described in two classic works:  HOFSTADTER & 
METZGER, supra note 1, and FREEDOM AND TENURE IN THE ACADEMY (William W. Van Alstyne 
ed., 1993).
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1894 Pullman Strike4 and who later ran for President fi ve times on the Socialist 
Party ticket. Stanford had no board of trustees. It instead had one trustee, Jane 
Lothrop Stanford, who was Leland Stanford’s widow. Leland Stanford, who 
died in 1893, had accumulated his fortune building and operating railroads, 
which he constructed by underpaying Asian laborers who had been imported 
for the purpose. In 1900 Ross made off -campus speeches arguing, in part, that 
importation of labor should be illegal and that railroads should be owned by 
government and operated for the public good. The university’s sole trustee 
demanded that he be dismissed, and he was, through a forced resignation. The 
chair of the history department was fi red after he protested what had happened 
to Ross. Seven other members of the Stanford faculty resigned in protest.
This and many other incidents led to the creation of the American Association 
of University Professors in 1915. Its fi rst President was John Dewey, who is still 
considered a leading fi gure in philosophy and educational psychology. He was 
an education reformist, and, out of solidarity with K-12 teachers, he joined 
the American Federation of Teachers. Immediately he appointed an AAUP 
committee of fi fteen academics, including Roscoe Pound, dean of the Harvard 
Law School,5 to draft the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom 
and Academic Tenure. 
Eight of the fi fteen had studied in German universities,6 and the Declaration’s 
fi rst sentence refers, using the German terminology, to both Lernfreiheit, the 
student’s academic freedom, and to Lehrfreiheit, the teacher’s academic freedom. 
But having acknowledged the former, the Declaration concentrated exclusively 
on the latter,7 which it divided into “freedom of inquiry and research; freedom 
of teaching within the university or college; and freedom of [extramural] 
4. Affi  rmed by a unanimous Supreme Court. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). A later conviction, 
for giving a speech opposing U.S. participation in World War I, was affi  rmed by the 
Supreme Court in an opinion by Holmes. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). While 
imprisoned in the Atlanta Penitentiary, Debs ran for President one last time and received 
almost a million votes.
5. Pound’s fi ngerprints are on the Declaration’s assertion that “the relationship of professor to 
trustees may be compared to that between judges of the Federal courts and the Executive 
who appoints them. University teachers should be understood to be, with respect to the 
conclusions reached and expressed by them, no more subject to the control of the trustees, 
than are judges subject to the control of the President . . . .” AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE 12 (1915) 
[hereinafter 1915 AAUP Declaration].
6. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 1, at 396.
7. Although U.S. courts do not use the German term Lernfreiheit or even the phrase student 
academic freedom, the concept is alive and well in American case law adjudicating the rights 
and obligations of tenured faculty. In the reported cases in which a teacher sued after tenure 
was revoked for behavior that made it substantially harder for students to learn, the teacher 
almost always lost in court. For example, see the cases in notes 28 and 30 as well as Tarasenko 
v. Univ. of Ark., 63 F. Supp. 3d 910 (E.D. Ark. 2014). The exceptions typically involve internal 
procedures rather than the facts on the merits. See note 18. As far as the law is concerned, 
student academic freedom outranks faculty academic freedom.
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utterance and action.”8 In later years, a consensus within the academy has 
added a fourth: freedom of intramural utterance and action, which means the 
freedom both to participate in governance and to comment within a school on 
how it is administered, all without fear of retribution.
The Declaration is perhaps the most eloquent and passionate justifi cation for 
academic freedom and academic job security. In its twenty-three pages are the 
following:
The responsibility of the university teacher is primarily to the public itself, 
and to the judgment of his own profession; and while, with respect to 
certain external conditions of his vocation, he accepts a responsibility to 
the authorities of the institution in which he serves, in the essentials of his 
professional activity his duty is to the wider public to which the institution 
itself is morally amenable . . . .9
It is scarcely open to question that freedom of utterance is as important to the 
teacher as it is to the investigator. [No one] can be a successful teacher unless 
he enjoys the respect of his students, and their confi dence in his intellectual 
integrity. It is clear, however, that this confi dence will be impaired if there is 
suspicion on the part of the student that the teacher is not expressing himself 
fully or frankly . . . . It is not only the character of the instruction but also the 
character of the instructor that counts; and if the student has reason to believe 
that the instructor is not true to himself, the virtue of the instruction as an 
educative force is incalculably diminished. There must be in the mind of the 
teacher no mental reservation.10
In that same year the AAUP created its Committee A, which in the century 
following has investigated and reported countless violations of academic 
freedom. Its fi rst case involved the University of Utah’s fi ring of teachers for 
comments made in class and for expressing—in private—unfavorable views of 
the university’s administration.
Of the dozens of faculty fi red before and around the time of the Declaration, 
none had any form of the job security other than, at best, one-year contracts.
The 1915 Declaration stated the faculty argument for academic freedom and 
job security. But for practical purposes the AAUP needed a less passionate 
document that colleges and universities might be willing to adopt as institutional 
policy. It negotiated with the Association of American Colleges to produce the 
1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure. That  document  has been 
adopted as policy by the overwhelming majority of American universities. 
The 1915 Declaration expresses the policy behind academic freedom. The 1940 
Statement expresses some but not all of the rules.
8. 1915  AAUP Declaration, supra note 5, at 6.
9. Id. at 12.
10. Id. at 14.
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2. Job Security Promotes Innovation
In addition to protecting academic freedom, job security has been shown 
by empirical research to increase innovation and creative problem-solving—
especially among highly educated employees such as J.D. faculty. The converse 
has also been shown empirically: People who can easily lose their jobs will not 
innovate because they cannot aff ord the risk.
The leading researcher on workplace creativity describes a study of 
“scientists working in research organizations . . . . [with] doctorates or master’s 
degrees”:
Four social-psychological factors seemed most important in facilitating the 
realization of creative potential: (1) high responsibility for initiating new 
activities, (2) high degree of power to hire research assistants, (3) no interference 
from [an] administrative superior, and (4) high stability of employment.11
In laboratory and other sciences, research assistants are essential in ways that 
are barely relevant to law faculty. But the rest of this list—and especially the last 
item—replicates what happens in law schools. One study found:
[E]mployees who fear that they might be laid off  may be more likely to try to 
avoid any behavior that would increase the likelihood of losing their positions. 
. . . The possibility that the threat of losing one’s job may have a negative 
impact on creative problem-solving is provocative. Our results demonstrate 
that this is the case. . . .12
According to another study:
Two key features of job roles may be important for ultimately realizing 
creativity in the workplace, specifi cally, a challenging job and freedom. When 
these are provided by the organization, employees are motivated to . . . attempt 
new approaches and ideas, even if they involve risk of failure.13
And still another one: 
The fi ndings involving . . . resistance to change are consistent across studies. . . . 
The positive correlation between job insecurity and resistance to change also 
is of interest because it . . . appears to contradict rational behavior.”14
11. TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT 210–11 (1996) (emphasis added).
12. Tahira M. Probst, Susan M. Stewart, Melissa L. Gruys & Bradley W. Tierney, Productivity, 
Counterproductivity and Creativity: The Ups and Downs of Job Security, 80 J. OCCUPATIONAL & 
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 479, 483, 491 (2007).
13. Ravit Cohen-Meitar & Abraham Carmeli, Linking Meaningfulness in the Workplace to Employee 
Creativity: The Intervening Role of Organizational Identifi cation and Positive Psychological Experiences, 21 
CREATIVITY RES. J. 361, 371 (2009).
14. Leonard Greenhalgh & Zehava Rosenblatt, Job Insecurity: Toward Conceptual Clarity, 9 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 438, 443 (1984).
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3. Tenure Per Se Does Not Impose Significant Costs
Tenure is not lifetime employment,15 which even the AAUP concedes.16
Tenure is a contract for indefi nite employment, which can be terminated by 
the school, following specifi ed procedures, whenever there is cause or fi nancial 
exigency. Through its power to make institutional policy, the school can defi ne 
cause17 and can determine the procedures.18
If the employer is a public institution, tenure can be contractual, but it is 
also subject to state statutes and involves constitutionally protected property 
rights19 as well as contract rights. A statute might defi ne cause and fi nancial 
exigency, and it might set out tenure-revocation procedures. If there is no 
statute, the school decides, through its internal policies, the meaning of cause 
and the nature of the procedures. Either way, procedures for public institutions 
must meet due process requirements.
As explained below, the tests for cause and for fi nancial exigency are 
easier to satisfy than faculty members might imagine. In the reported cases on 
tenure revocation, the dismissed faculty member rarely wins in court.
The tenure contract is not usually expressed in a single, integrated writing 
executed by both parties. Instead the contract incorporates the school’s 
regulations and personnel policies as well as any agreements directly between 
the school and the faculty member.20 The school is free to change the relevant 
regulations and policies, and the tenure contract is automatically revised to 
incorporate the changes. A faculty member who continues to work at the 
school is deemed to have agreed to those changes. Throughout contract law, 
15. STEVEN G. POSKANZER, HIGHER EDUCATION LAW: THE FACULTY 208 (2002).
16. A former AAUP president wrote in the AAUP’s own journal that tenure “lays no claim 
whatever to a guarantee of lifetime employment.” William Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary, 
Explanation, and “Defense,” 57 AAUP BULL. 328, 328 (1971).
17. If the school’s policy documents use the word cause without specifying its meaning, courts 
enforce the meaning found in other schools’ policy documents or in the case law, which 
contract law categorizes as trade usage or industry practice. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 203 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
18. Even where the school initially does not follow its internal procedures, the faculty member 
will still be dismissed as long as the school is eventually able to prove cause or fi nancial 
exigency.  If a court rules for the faculty member on the internal procedural error, the school 
simply redoes the internal process, after which a court will rule for the school on the merits, 
or the parties will settle privately. For example, Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, 689 F.3d 
558 (6th Cir. 2012).
19. Because the due process clause does not protect contract rights, courts will accept an 
argument that tenure is a property right, but only for the purpose of adjudicating federal 
due process claims involving public universities. In those cases, however, a state law contract 
claim can usually be pleaded on the same facts.
20. The tenure-revocation case law is fi lled with statements like this: “Plaintiff ’s contractual 
relationship with the University appears to consist of only two documents: the Faculty Code 
and the Faculty Handbook.” Saha v. George Wash. Univ., 577 F. Supp. 2d 439, 442 (D. D.C. 
2008), aff ’d, 358 F. App’x 205 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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this is a familiar practice. Credit card companies amend our contracts the same 
way, with the same eff ect.
Tenure does not protect a faculty member’s salary. Nothing in the law of tenure 
prevents reduction of a tenured faculty member’s salary.21 Courts hold that 
“tenure by itself does not guarantee any particular salary level”22 and “no 
college is required to perpetuate and even improve salaries or benefi ts each 
year, simply because the incumbent is tenured . . . .”23 To bring compensation 
in line with value, a school can legally reduce the salary of an unproductive 
faculty member, tenured or not. Medical schools began experiencing cost 
crises in the 1990s, partially because federal funds became less freely available, 
and began then in some instances to reduce salaries for nonproductivity.24 Law 
schools have the legal authority to do the same thing.
Tenure does not protect other workplace benefi ts. It does not guarantee assignment 
to teach a faculty member’s favorite courses,25 or to keep an offi  ce the faculty 
member has used for decades, or to be provided with resources such as research 
assistants or travel funds.26 Tenure protects only a job. It does not guarantee 
a good job. And it does not guarantee as good a job next year as the faculty 
member had last year.
Tenure does not prevent a school from downsizing faculty. When a university has a bona 
fi de fi nancial exigency, courts uniformly hold that a tenured faculty member 
may be dismissed on that basis alone, regardless of how well the faculty 
member is doing the job, with the sole condition that the school have acted in 
good faith.27 A fi nancial exigency can be based entirely on enrollment declines 
21. See, e.g., Williams v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Sci. Ctr., 6 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 1993); Keen v. 
Penson, 970 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1992); Chang v. Univ. of Toledo, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (N.D. 
Ohio 2007); Tavoloni v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 26 F. Supp. 2d 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Univ. 
of Miami v. Frank, 920 So.2d 81 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2006). The single reported contrary 
case was decided for the plaintiff  only because his off er letter had promised that throughout 
his employment, he would be paid a salary computed according to a formula recited in the 
letter—a rare situation in higher education and unheard of in law schools. Helpin v. Trs. of 
the Univ. of Pa., 10 A.3d 267 (Pa. 2010).
22. Conlay v. Baylor Coll. of Med., No. H–08–1038, 2010 WL 774162, ¶ 19 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
23. Klinge v. Ithaca Coll., 634 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1995), aff ’d on other grounds, 652 
N.Y.S.2d 377 (App. Div. 1997).
24. See Sarah A. Bunton, The Relationship Between Tenure and Guaranteed Salary for U.S. Medical School 
Faculty, ANALYSIS IN BRIEF, Apr. 2010, https://www.aamc.org/download/125190/data/
aibvol9_no6.pdf [https://perma.cc/G579-M944].
25. See e.g., Cussler v. Univ. of Md., 430 F. Supp. 602, 608 (D. Md. 1977) (“[n]o faculty member 
has a vested right in any course”); Sabinson v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 999 A.2d 380 
(N.H. 2010) (same).
26. Gertler v. Goodgold, 487 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567–68 (App. Div. 1985), aff ’d, 489 N.E.2d 748 (N.Y. 
1985) (“[N]othing in the complaint or the record show[ed] that tenure guarantees a faculty 
member any offi  ce at all, much less space of his own choosing.”).
27. Even where an institution’s internal regulations and personnel policies do not explicitly 
provide for terminations due to fi nancial exigency, courts have held that the power is 
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or failure to meet enrollment projections.28 Even if the university as a whole 
is fi nancially healthy, it can downsize a specifi c unit for declining enrollment 
and can choose to dismiss tenured faculty members in that unit alone.29 Some 
courts have even permitted institutions downsizing faculty to retain untenured 
faculty members while discharging or furloughing tenured ones.30
Tenured faculty can be fi red for behavior that leads to fi ring outside academia. A 
school can terminate tenured faculty who do their jobs badly. This can 
include inadequate teaching,31 inability to get along with co-workers,32 sex 
implied in tenure contracts because “[t]he authority to terminate tenured faculty members 
because of an economic crisis is an important tool to college administrators in maintaining 
fi scal stability.” T. Michael Bolger & David D. Wilmoth, Dismissal of Tenured Faculty Members for 
Reasons of Financial Exigency, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 347, 348 (1982).
28. See, e.g., Bignall v. N. Idaho Coll., 538 F.2d 243, 249 (9th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 
377 F. Supp. 227, 230, 235 (W.D. Wis. 1974); Graney v. Bd. of Regents, 286 N.W.2d 138, 145 
(Wis. App. 1979).
29. See, e.g., Krotkoff  v. Goucher Coll., 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978); Rose v. Elmhurst Coll., 379 
N.E.2d 791, 794 (Ill. App. 1978); Scheuer v. Creighton Univ., 260 N.W.2d 595 (Neb. 1977).
30. Brenna v. S. Colo. State Coll., 589 F.2d 475, 476–77 (10th Cir. 1978); Graham v. Columbia 
Coll., 2012 WL 1098625 & 2012 WL 1072231 (D. S.C. 2012); Odynocki v. Southern Univ. at 
New Orleans, 2006 WL 3230348 (E.D. La. 2006). But in some schools a collective bargaining 
agreement might require that untenured faculty be dismissed before tenured faculty are.
31. See, e.g., Agarwal v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 788 F.2d 504, 506 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(“incompetent as a teacher, frequently harassing students and behaving in an unprofessional 
manner toward colleagues”); King v. Univ. of Minn., 774 F.2d 224, 225 (8th Cir. 1985) (“poor 
teaching performance, excessive unexcused absences from class, absences from faculty 
meetings, low enrollment in his classes”); Potemra v. Ping, 462 F. Supp. 328, 330–31 (S.D. 
Ohio 1978) (not responding to questions in class, criticizing students for asking questions, 
behaving belligerently to students, giving failing grades vindictively, and refusing to attend 
faculty meetings); Jawa v. Fayetteville State Univ., 426 F.Supp. 218. 224 (E.D. N.C. 1976) (“a 
poor teacher . . . apparently unwilling to prepare for class; . . . diffi  culty interacting with . . . 
[and] little interest in his students; . . . failed to keep offi  ce hours and to advise properly his 
students”); Peterson v. N.D. Univ. Sys., 678 N.W.2d 163 (N.D. 2004) (revealing confi dential 
information about a student to other students, ending a class a month before the semester 
ended, and ignoring student questions and individual student requests for assistance); 
Riggin v. Bd. of Trs., 489 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (teaching without adequate 
preparation, habitually discussing irrelevant material in class, failing to cover material listed 
in the school’s offi  cial course description, canceling classes, and not keeping regular offi  ce 
hours). But see Silva v. Univ. of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994) (“academic freedom 
permits faculty members freedom to choose specifi c pedagogic techniques”) (italics added) 
(quoting affi  davit of William Van Alstyne).
32. See, e.g., Bowling v. Scott, 587 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1979) (“failed to perform his assigned 
duties and committed acts inimical to the effi  cient functioning of the Department of 
English”); De Llano v. Berglund, 282 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2002) (repeatedly insulted 
colleagues, made false accusations, and fi led frivolous job grievances); Sengupta v. Univ. 
of Alaska, 21 P.3d 1240 (Alaska 2001) (treating colleagues and administrators in a dishonest, 
abusive, and demeaning manner); Bernold v. Bd. of Governors, 683 S.E.2d 428, 431 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2009) (“interactions with colleagues had been so disruptive that the eff ective and 
effi  cient operation of his department was impaired”); Phillips v. State Bd. of Regents, 863 
S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tenn. 1993) (“[l]ack of professional behavior towards peers, administrators, 
and staff ”).
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harassment,33 nonexistent or defective scholarship,34 and insubordination.35 
Although academics might be surprised at the last item in that list, abundant 
case law supports fi ring tenured faculty for insubordination. Tenure does not 
give a faculty member the power to refuse, for example, a directive to attend 
graduation or an assignment to chair a heavy-workload faculty committee. 
Academic freedom does not prevent university offi  cials from managing their 
organization, assigning tasks, or enforcing workplace rules.
Revocation of tenure isn’t the only available remedy. A university can 
suspend a tenured faculty member without pay in an attempt to resolve a 
personnel problem short of dismissal36 or as a last step before dismissal.37 And 
it can reduce salary for the reasons explained above.
4. Job Security Under ABA Standard 405(c) Imposes No Significant Costs
Law schools are accredited by the American Bar Association—or more 
specifi cally, the governing Council of the ABA Section of Legal Education 
and Admissions to the Bar. The ABA’s Standards for Approval of Law 
Schools require every school to have a system of tenure.38 For faculty outside 
the conventional tenure system, the ABA requires other forms of job security. 
33. See, e.g., McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 1995); Levitt v. Univ. of Tex., 759 F.2d 1224 
(5th Cir. 1985); Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504 (10th Cir. 1998); Traster v. 
Ohio N. Univ., 2015 WL 10739302 (N.D. Ohio 2015); Haegert v. Univ. of Evansville, 977 
N.E.2d 924 (Ind. 2012); Murphy v. Duquesne Univ., 777 A.2d 418 (Pa. 2001).
34. See, e.g., Roberts v. Columbia Coll. Chi., 821 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2015) (plagiarism); Agarwal, 788 
F.2d at 504 (plagiarism combined with poor teaching); King, 774 F.2d at 225 (“undocumented 
research” combined with poor teaching); Riggin, 489 N.E.2d at 626  (“had not engaged in 
research or scholarly activities for at least 10 years,” combined with poor teaching).
35. See, e.g., McConnell v. Howard Univ., 818 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (refusing to teach a class 
that included a student who had clashed with the professor); Shaw v. Bd. of Trs., 549 F.2d 
929 (4th Cir. 1976) (refusing to attend a faculty workshop and refusing to participate in a 
graduation ceremony); Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., (6th Cir. 2012) (refusing 
to teach an assigned course); Smith v. Kent State Univ., 696 F.2d 476, 477 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(refusing to teach a course because it would “lower his standing among the academic 
community”); Garrett v. Mathews, 474 F.Supp. 594, 597 (N.D. Ala. 1979) (“failing to 
supply a list of publications, failing to open mail from Dr. Hobby, and failing to post and 
keep offi  ce hours”); Jawa, 426 F.Supp. at 224 (“uncooperative with his colleagues and the 
administration; . . . unwilling or unable to follow . . . directives of his superiors and comply 
with University policies and procedures”); Pollock v. Univ. of S. Cal., No. B145203, 2001 
WL 1513870, *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2001) (refusing a teaching assignment); Hefl in v. 
Kansas City Kansas Cmty. Coll., 224 P.3d 1201 (Kan. 2010) (refusing to hold offi  ce hours at 
a designated location); Josberger v. Univ. of Tenn., 706 S.W.2d 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) 
(refusing to perform assigned tasks).
36. See, e.g., Wexley v. Mich. St. Univ., 25 F.3d 1052 (6th Cir. 1994); Tennyson v. Univ. of Minn., 
No. A07–1095, 2008 WL 2344257 (Minn. Ct. App. June 10, 2008); Mills v. W. Wash. Univ., 
246 P.3d 1254 (Wash. 2011).
37. See, e.g., Murphy,  745 A.2d at 1228; Potemra v. Ping, 462 F. Supp. 328 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
38. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND 
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2015-2016, at 29 (Standard 405(b)) 
(2015) (“A law school shall have an established and announced policy with respect to 
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Under ABA Standard 405(c):
A law school shall aff ord to full-time clinical faculty members a form of security 
of position reasonably similar to tenure, and non-compensatory perquisites 
reasonably similar to those provided other full-time faculty members.39
This is supplemented by ABA Interpretation 405–6:
A form of security of position reasonably similar to tenure includes a separate 
tenure track or a program of renewable long-term contracts. Under a separate 
tenure track, a full-time clinical faculty member, after a probationary period 
reasonably similar to that for other full-time faculty, may be granted tenure . . 
. . For the purposes of this Interpretation, “long-term contract” means at least 
a fi ve-year contract that is presumptively renewable or other arrangement suffi  cient 
to ensure academic freedom.40
(Interpretations are published with the Standards and are considered as 
binding as the Standards.)
In the law of evidence, a presumption shifts or assigns a burden of proof 
by presuming a conclusion of law.41 If a teacher has a Standard 405(c) 
presumptively renewable contract, the teacher has a contractual right, when 
that contract ends, to a new (renewed) contract of the same length unless the 
school has admissible evidence suffi  cient to overcome the presumption that 
the teacher satisfi es the school’s renewal criteria, which the ABA requires every 
school to establish.42 The teacher is not required to prove that she satisfi es the 
criteria. That is presumed. Instead the school must prove that she does not 
satisfy them. For example, if the school’s written policy requires “excellence” 
in teaching, and if that is the issue, the school must prove that the teacher’s 
teaching is not “excellent.” If the school cannot prove that but nevertheless 
fails to renew the contract, the school, as a matter of contract law, is liable 
for breach of the expiring presumptively renewable contract. (The teacher’s 
remedy is in court—not at the ABA.)
The ABA also requires a school to provide governance rights (and 
responsibilities) to clinical faculty:
academic freedom and tenure . . . .”) [hereinafter 2015-16 ABA STANDARDS].
39. Id. (Standard 405(c)).
40. Id. (Interpretation 405–6 (italics added)).
41. For example, the criminal presumption of innocence assigns to the government the burden 
of proving guilt because, unless the government carries that burden, the law considers the 
defendant innocent.
42. 2015-16 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 38, at 30 (Interpretation 405–7): “. . . A law school should 
develop criteria for retention, promotion, and security of employment of full-time clinical 
faculty.”
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“A law school shall aff ord to full-time clinical faculty members participation 
in faculty meetings, committees, and other aspects of law school governance 
in a manner reasonably similar to other full-time faculty members.”43
Clinicians are the faculty members most likely to be attacked by outside 
interests in exactly the kind of interference that led to creation of the AAUP 
and its 1915 Declaration. Robert Kuehn and Peter Joy identifi ed thirty-six 
publicly known instances from 1968 to 2010 of interferences, or attempted 
interferences, with clinicians’ academic freedom, by governors, government 
agencies, legislatures, private industry, donors, alumni, and university 
administrators and trustees.44 These thirty-six incidents are just the tip of an 
iceberg. Most attacks on clinical academic freedom happen quietly and never 
become public. In a 2005 survey, twelve percent of clinicians “reported similar 
interference in their courses.”45
The ABA’s Standards do not defi ne the term clinician, but in practice the 
ABA appears to treat it as including both those who teach in client-based 
clinics and those who teach skills in other settings, such as simulation courses. 
A number of schools have provided legal writing faculty with 405(c) clinical 
tenure or presumptively renewable contracts even though not required by the 
ABA. (The ABA’s legal writing job security requirements, in Standard 405(d), 
are less stringent than those in Standard 405(c).46)
Schools provide 405(c) job security to legal writing faculty for the same reason 
they grant tenure to casebook teachers: to protect faculty academic freedom 
and to gain the benefi ts of each teacher’s capacity to innovate. Additionally, as 
other articles in this volume explain, legal writing is an overwhelmingly female 
fi eld, and a school that provides lesser forms of job security to its legal writing 
faculty can create issues of sex discrimination regardless of whether the school 
satisfi es ABA requirements.
A number of legal writing teachers have described instances in which their 
academic freedom has been compromised in ways that doctrinal faculty would 
not tolerate in their own courses. These include requiring all the school’s 
legal writing teachers to use identical syllabi, to grade each assignment in 
specifi ed ways, to give certain types of writing assignments, and to assign 
certain textbooks, prohibiting other types of writing assignments and other 
43. Id. (Interpretation 405–8, which includes an exception for temporary teachers specifi ed in 
the last sentence of Standard 405(c)). Id. at 29 (Standard 405(c).
44. Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, “Kneecapping” Academic Freedom, ACADEME, Nov.-Dec. 2010, at 
11.
45. Id.
46. 2015–16 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 38, at 29 (Standard 405(d): “A law school shall aff ord 
legal writing teachers such security of position and other rights and privileges of faculty 
membership as may be necessary to (1) attract and retain a faculty that is well qualifi ed 
to provide legal writing instruction as required by Standard 303(a)(2), and (2) safeguard 
academic freedom.”).
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textbooks. These are violations of the academic freedom to teach as one thinks 
best, which the 1915 Declaration eloquently describes, and they can extinguish 
creativity and the capacity to innovate in the school’s legal writing program.
The Association of American Law Schools requires that member schools 
guarantee as much academic freedom to skills and legal writing teachers as to 
casebook faculty. Under AALS Executive Committee Regulation 4.2:
“Defi nition of Faculty. For purposes of this chapter, ‘faculty member’ means a 
professional who is or was tenured, on the tenure track, or, although not on the 
tenure track, engaged in teaching or scholarship, including work in a clinical or 
research and writing program at a member school.”47
Under AALS Bylaw 6.6(d):
“A faculty member shall have academic freedom and tenure in accordance 
with the principles of the American Association of University Professors.”48 
An ABA committee summarized the AAUP documents as follows: 
“Neither the 1915 Declaration nor the 1940 Statement says or implies that it 
might be permissible to discriminate among fi elds of study by allocating more 
academic freedom to some and less to others.”49
5. Conclusion
Job security—tenure or another form under ABA Standard 405(c)—is 
essential to every full-time faculty member’s academic freedom.
Despite myths to the contrary, no form of job security inherently raises the 
cost of education to any signifi cant degree. Nothing in academic employment 
law prevents discharge, suspension, or salary reduction for a bad teacher, a 
bad scholar, a disruptive colleague, or an insubordinate faculty member. Job 
security does not protect salary or other workplace benefi ts. And it does not 
prevent faculty downsizing. 
Because the law does not link salary to job security, a school can, without 
increasing its annual budget, grant tenure-track protection to 405(c) and 
405(d) faculty. Fairness and wisdom, however, should motivate a school to do 
more by equalizing salaries as well as job security, and the other articles in this 
volume eloquently explain why. This articl e shows that even if a school will 
not equalize salary, it can still equalize job security.
Cost is no excuse.
47. ASS’N OF AM. L. SCHS., 2016 HANDBOOK 75 (2016) (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 59.
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